



Politics, Political Will and the Impasse of Disaster Management Policy Implementation in Nigeria's Fourth Republic

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Abstract

Often labeled as the slickest concept in the policy lexicon and at the same time, an important ingredient required for policy success, political will remain the most cited reason for policy failure. In Nigeria, particularly since the return of civil rule in 1999, many notable policies and action plans have been designed to curb the challenges that disasters pose to all facets of national life. However, those policies and plans, particularly the ones on Disaster Risk Reduction, and the National Disaster Management Framework, the most comprehensive disaster management policy in the country have not attained their formulation goals. The NDMF stipulates that disaster management operations shall be tailored after the country's federal political structure, thereby requiring the commitment of the three levels of government. Yet, lack of political will has often been labelled the most prominent of those factors responsible for the limitation in the implementation of the policy. While issues around policy implementation have gained sufficient attention in the literature, no known work has viewed the subject matter through the lenses of 'politicized' political will, and from a disaster management standpoint, hence, this article. Methodologically, the article draws from secondary data including published data from relevant government agencies. Findings reveal that although many other factors from the country's complex policy environment contributed to the low level of implementation of disaster management policies, lack of will from the political class, as displayed in its inability to make adequate funds available



accounted for the dreary level of implementation of disaster management policies. It was posited that the level of success achieved in the policy process is incumbent on the deliberate actions and inactions of the political class.

Keywords: Politics, political will, policy implementation, policy success, disaster management, Nigeria's Fourth Republic.

Introduction

Over the years, the presence of 'political will' or its absence has often been cited as a significant factor responsible for policy success or failure. Although habitually considered vague, equivocal and the slipperiest concept in the policy lexicon, political will is an indispensable ingredient in the policy process. Put more succinctly, political will connotes the ability of a politician, a set of policy-makers, authorised government officials, or bureaucrats to possess sufficient determination to execute policies. However, such conceptualization has attracted serious concerns, particularly on how to measure 'determination' and will, since 'will' literally stems from the psychological standpoint. Notwithstanding, policy outcomes are considered as a product of many factors, such as the availability of economic and material resources, consensus among social and interest groups, institutional capacity, and the willingness to effect policy outcomes (Post et al, 2010; Ikelegbe, 2019). Nevertheless, political will has been politicized, and labeled for policy failures even when the concerned authorities fail to allocate adequate resources and monitor the same to implement the desired policy outcomes.

As it concerns disaster management, the government is mandated to set in motion and ensure the process of mitigating against, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from disasters. Since disasters occur within the confines of geo-political spaces, it is required that the government, which holds the mandate of administering the affairs of the state take action. These actions must be deliberate and should cater to the four domains of disaster management: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. The means through which such outcomes are achieved is public policy. Noticeably, policy execution in disaster management is viewed as perhaps the most delicate demonstration of a state's capacity to govern, as it conveys to the table the shortfalls of administrative, political, and technological decision-making and underscores social susceptibility and access to

justice (Singh, 2023). Notwithstanding, experiences from Nigeria have shown that limited budgetary provisions, low institutional capacity bureaucratic ineptitude, and corruption have hampered the implementation of policies on disaster management, validating the thesis that the implementation phase is the graveyard of many good policies in the country (Olugbenga, 2013; Adefisoye & Adefisoye, 2020).

For instance, after the introduction of the Hyogo Framework for Action in 2005, relevant authorities in Nigeria set in motion the process of domesticating the global initiative geared towards Disaster Risk Reduction through government policies and emphasis on mitigation and prevention. However, such enthusiasm waned due to inadequate budgetary provisions, underscoring the level of government's political will towards policy implementation in disaster management. A similar fate has befallen the National Disaster Management Framework (NDMF) which is commonly regarded as the most comprehensive disaster management framework in the country. The NDMF stipulates that disaster management operations in the country shall be tailored after its federal political structure, thereby requiring the commitment of the three levels of government. Yet, there is so much laxity, particularly at the state level, and a total dysfunction at the local government level.

While issues around policy implementation have gained sufficient attention in the literature, no known work has viewed the subject matter through the lenses of 'politicised' political will, and from a disaster management standpoint, hence, this article. Structurally, this paper is divided into six sections. The section after the introduction presents scholarly perspectives on political will, while the third explains the content and intent of disaster management policies. The fourth section examines two major disaster management policies in the country, while the fifth section analyses the politicised political will viz disaster management policy implementation in Nigeria. The last section concludes the paper.

Perspectives on Political Will

Political will is an important construct in the policy lexicon. Social groups, policy scholars, and the media have at one point or the other attributed policy success or failure to the government's possession or lack of political will. Despite such importance, the phrase 'political will' does not lend itself to a precise definition, and the parameter for measuring it is unclear. Put differently, political will is ambiguous, equivocal, and has conjured analytical uncertainty. Post et al, (2010)



provide an important cue to resolving the puzzle, and demystifying the complexities associated with producing an enduring and universally-acceptable construct on 'political will'. The authors raised the following fundamental questions and concerns:

- i. Does political will possess both binary and continuous properties (like democracy) large enough to determine or achieve a particular binary outcome, such as the passage and the implementation of a specific public policy?
- ii. Is political will an individual-level or group-level concept, since *polis*, the root word for 'political' stems from the arena of social collectivity and is an aggregation of group decisions?
- iii. Should the issue of capacity, that is the ability of a policy jurisdiction to possess the ability and resources to implement outcomes be included?
- iv. Is it possible to have a systematic and effective definition in the face of unstable political situations?
- v. Can the definition of political will have universal acceptance or should it be context-specific?

The foregoing has a lot of implications for arriving at a common ground on 'political will'. Nonetheless, an attempt to define the concept should foremost put into consideration the uniqueness of policy context, availability of resources, and the socio-cultural factors that impinge on the policy process. Therefore, defining 'political will' is subject to the vagaries and impulses of the political environment. In addition, the phrase tends to be better understood in its absence. The concept of will as a political process involves complexly aggregated preferences of a large number of political actors, and which is largely context-dependent" (Mujkic, 2015, p. 14).

Differently, Smigoc (2015, p. 33) contends that most contemporary writers view political will from the "prism of functioning of political systems and public policies, and through the analysis of institutional mechanisms and their human potential to implement political will". According to him, political will can be studied from different perspectives, particularly the psychological dimension. The centrality of this perspective is that since political institutions and the policy cycle are moribund outside the human elements, a bid to understand political will should take into account the idiosyncrasies and mental processes of policy actors and decision-makers. In this context, 'will' is conceived as a product of a human's psychological or mental development, and thus, mobilises, directs, and gives purpose to a certain activity or set of activities. In the same vein, Rigoni et al (2011) explain that 'willpower' connotes the ability to control our conduct,



which is most noticeable in those personal activities that are connected to self-discipline, decision-making process, complex problem solving and conflict resolution. The foregoing further attests to the complex nature and the analytical vagueness that political will conjures.

Since the flagship work of Hammergren in 1998, 'political will' has enjoyed unprecedented fame, making it an important tool for achieving political goals and for cataloguing policy failure particularly when the problem is opaque (Post et al, 2010). Hammergren (1998, p. 12) attested to this foregoing by stating that political will is "the slipperiest concept in the policy lexicon" but remains "the *sine qua non* of policy success which is never defined except by its absence". This, in itself, projects logical absurdity. Mujkic (2015) remarked that politics as one of the most intriguing concepts in contemporary political theory is usually mentioned as the centre of power, and to political decision-makers as the key actors in good governance.

Despite the definitional uncertainty, political will simply is the inability of a political or administrative instrument to achieve a political or policy outcome. In another way, political will may be the inability of a political leader to pursue and attain his or her political ends. Of course, political outcomes are multi-causal and consist of the availability of resources, institutional capacity, impediments from social and interest groups, and unforeseen factors. But, how is political will or its absence detected in a policy process? Post et al (2010) argued that political will is detected when a sufficient number of decision-makers agree on the effectiveness of the policy, share a common understanding of the problem, and are fully committed to providing support. On the other hand, political will is not detected when any or all of the sub-conceptual areas are not covered.

From the foregoing, it can be deduced that political will is the degree of devoted support among critical decision-makers for a particular policy solution to a particular problem. Mujkic (2015) has sarcastically posited that the 'situation' in political life that is often superficially described as the absence of political will is nothing but another manifestation of the political will itself. As it relates to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Duro Sunjic expressed that lack of 'political will' is the dictum mostly deployed to defend or clarify the absence or the lack of execution of public policies, and is predominantly used by politicians but widely accepted and commonly used in the analyses by civil society activists, media and academic and professional community (Sunjic, 2015). According to Sunjic (2015), there is an organic relationship between 'will' and public policy because the



actors who decide the process of policy formulation and implementation include elected and appointed political office holders, civil servants, formal and informal interest groups (civil society), economic organizations, and interested citizens. Put differently, political will is constituted by the will of public policy players, and as such, policy formation and implementation are required.

Thus, political will is defined by Anderson et al. (2005) as the willingness that is demonstrated by inclusivity and commitment. In a similar vein, Rose and Greeley (2006) assert that political will refers to the persistent dedication of officials and legislators to allocate political capital toward the accomplishment of particular goals. According to Post et al. (2010, p. 658) "the distribution of preferences about the outcome of interest; the authority, capacity, and legitimacy of key decision-makers or reformers; and commitment to preferences" are the three groups of sub-concepts that make up the complex, multifaceted concept of 'political will'.

However, it becomes imperative to state that the amount of the 'will' possessed by a political actor or the degree to which such will is exhibited may be a function of the nature of the political environment. Concerning Nigeria's policy environment, Ikelegbe argued that authority and power, politics and political rationality, social and primordial dimensions, technical/technological factors, rational dimension, extra-rational dimensions, and resources are crucial factors that determine public policy in the country's complex policy context and not just political will (Ikelegbe, 2019).

To climax this debate, it must however be noted that any workable definition of political will must consider the following elements: a sufficient set of decision-makers; a common understanding of a particular problem on the formal agenda; commitment to supporting; and a commonly perceived, potentially effective policy solution (Post et al, 2010). However, the phrase 'sufficient decision-makers' is relative and may vary from one policy context to another. Besides, in a multi-cultural or multi-ethnic clime where primordiality takes precedence over rationality, achieving a common ground is difficult. This further reinforces the argument that political will is contextual and environmentally driven.

Disaster Management Policy

Generally, a policy is a deliberate course of action or human conduct that regulates one's behaviour. Although this position may be



interpreted differently when applied to the 'public' domain. According to Pearson, defining 'public' and taking into account how the term has evolved in both theory and practice should be the first steps in any conversation about public policy. The aspect of human behaviour that is seen as "requiring governmental or societal regulation or intervention or at least common action" is what he refers to as "public" (Pearson, 1999). Thomas Dye's definition is quite clear, which implies that a policy may mean something different when it comes to the "private" sphere than it does for the public one.

Dye defined public policy as whatever the government decides to do or not to do, which connotes the government's actions and inactions. Adesina Sambo sees public policy as what authorities do when they are seized with the political process of sharing societal resources among competing values (1999). Sambo's definition establishes public policy as a political process that requires resource-sharing and resource utilisation. In other words, while politics, as argued by the Estonian school is the authoritative allocation of values, public policy is the instrument to which those values are allocated. According to Agagu (2010), public policy represents an intention, pronouncement, general plan, or action adopted by a government to solve a social problem, counter a threat, deal with a given circumstance or pursue an objective in a given state. Elaborately, the shadow of the state is cast over various societal spheres. Heywood contends that even such areas considered private are regulated by the state through the policy instrument (Heywood, 2009).

It must be noted that one of the factors that distinguish public policy from private is that it is developed by government officials. Dye puts it that a policy cannot be considered as a public policy until such policy is adopted, implemented, and enforced by government institutions. Besides, government institutions give public policy three distinctive characteristics, namely: legitimacy, universality, and coercion" (Dye, 2005). Although the focus here is not on government institutions, it is important to establish such linkage. Sentra (2013); and Singh (2023) have argued that the first step to take in the management of disasters is to set up institutions with the overall responsibility to formulate and implement policy actions. Singh elaborated that part of the prerequisites for implementing disaster management policies include the existence of a framework in the form of a legal act as a baseline functional requirement; and a coordination body as the National Disaster Management Authority.

At this juncture, it is expedient to state that disaster management policies and action plans stemmed from the need to manage the



overwhelming effect that disaster occurrences pose on government spending and the overall development of the state. Disasters constitute a major hindrance to development and its sustainability. When disasters strike, families lose homes, their loved ones, properties, and means of livelihood; while an active community loses its functioning (OXFAM, 2013). Consequently, and to a large extent, the Pandora's Box of poverty, infrastructural decay, outbreaks of diseases, and serious humanitarian crises are opened (Adefisoye, 2019). Studies have shown that disasters can cancel progress on poverty reduction and distort national economic growth (Sadiq, 2012; Shepherd et al., 2013; Twigg, 2015; Adefisoye, 2019; Adefisoye & Agagu, 2021; Adefisoye & Arum, 2022; Adefisoye et al 2023). Consequently, managing disasters arises from the inevitable demands placed on humanity by hapless disaster incidents (Adefisoye, 2019).

Importantly, public policies in disaster management are intended to achieve the general mandate of "coordinating and integrating of all activities necessary to build, sustain, and improve the capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, and recover from threatening or actual natural or human-induced disasters" (NDMF, 2011, p. 2). Put differently, the major intention of a policy framework in disaster management is to establish a process and structure for a coordinated and effective delivery of assistance, and to address the consequences of major disasters declared in a country, region, and locality under appropriate national, regional, and local legislation (Adefisoye & Agagu, 2021). Hence, there is a need to invest in the development of institutional capacity that could adequately respond to emergencies and disasters (Adefisoye & Agagu, 2021).

Disaster Management Policies and Action Plans in Nigeria

Nigeria's federal political system, which consists of three levels of government: federal, state, and local, is the model for the country's disaster management system. It is noteworthy that the majority of public policies in Nigeria often have an intergovernmental component, and this configuration presents certain special difficulties. The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) was assigned the primary responsibility for developing policies and directing the efforts of other federal government agencies as well as state agencies within the federation (NDMF, 2011). In this setup, the State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) is responsible for replicating and executing NEMA's actions at the state level. Additionally, SEMA is tasked with coordinating the Local Emergency Management Committee (LEMC)'s activities at the local government level (NDMF,



2011). As the lead agency NEMA has over the years formulated frameworks and action plans that to a certain extent cover and 'cater for' the different components and aspects of emergency and disaster management. This paper focuses on the National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2006-2015; and the National Disaster Management Framework (NDMF), 2011 to achieve its objective.

National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2006-2015

In general, disaster risk reduction (DRR) refers to actions taken to lessen the possible effects of a disaster on people, socioeconomic activity, and the environment (UNISDR, 2005; NDMF, 2011). It is the process of incorporating comprehensive catastrophe plans into the formulation of public policies to address a wide range of environmental, social, and economic issues. According to Twigg (2015), disaster risk reduction (DRR) is commonly defined as the creation and implementation of practices, policies, and initiatives aimed at lowering the likelihood of disasters and increasing social preparedness. It is the process of defending against the effects of dangers the assets and means of subsistence of communities and individuals. Through governmental regulations and proactive measures taken by communities, disaster management organizations, and people, disaster risk reduction (DRR) aims to reduce the adverse effects of hazards and catastrophes.

At the United Nations Yokohama Strategy of 1994, it was concluded that disaster prevention, mitigation, and preparedness which are components of DRR are better than disaster response. This belief perhaps propelled the introduction of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) in 2005, which was a ten (10) year action plan (2005-2015). The overall goal of the HFA was to "make the world safer from natural hazards (UNISDR, 2011). It is important to note that, just as other global initiatives, the United Nations sought the cooperation of member-states to domesticate/implement the DRR by mainstreaming its cardinal objectives into all the facets of national life.

On the return from the World Conference on DRR held in January 2005 and in a bid to domesticate and implement the objectives of the Hyogo Framework, NEMA convened a multi-stakeholder Roundtable meeting in March of the same year (NEMA, 2009). The Roundtable that was chaired by the Chairman, of the House Committee on Disaster Management had in attendance, relevant government MDAs, SEMAs/SEMCs, building construction professionals, NGOs, and academia. One of the products of the meeting was the setting up of a Steering Committee led by NEMA which had the Institute of Peace,



and Conflict Resolution, the National Planning Commission, the National Orientation Agency (NOA), the National Television Authority (NTA), the Red Cross, NGOs and academia as members (NEMA, 2009). Notably, the National Platform Position paper which was submitted in early 2006 was adopted as the guiding principle by the Committee established by NEMA's Governing Council. The Committee was saddled with the responsibility of drafting an overarching National Policy for Disaster Management for Nigeria; taking into cognizance the paradigm shift to DRR and the need to mainstream it into development programmes in Nigeria (NEMA, 2009). This initiative was followed with the production and adoption of the National Policy on DRR in July 2006. To keep pace with the realization of the objectives of DRR in Nigeria, one percent of Nigeria's annual budget was allocated to mitigate ecological problems and underlying risk factors; 20% of the fund was directly allocated to NEMA, while other relevant MDAs such as the Ministries of Health, Environmental were to get their shares (Sani-Sidi, 2015). In addition, the National Platform on DRR attracted foreign support from agencies like the UNDP, UNHABITAT, and UNCR.

Despite these initiatives and others, Nigeria's attempt at domestication and implementing the objectives of HFA was halted by certain constraints including the incompleteness of the Vulnerability and Capacity Analysis (VCA). The VCA that was initially meant to be carried out in about 21 states of the federation was only conducted in 7 states. This according to Fagbemi (2011) was due to inadequate funding. Other constraints were; the lack of an existing database; inadequate involvement of the regional commission for the transboundary implementation of DRR programmes; and inadequate monitoring and evaluation of projects among others (Sani-Sidi, 2015).

(b) National Disaster Management Framework (NDMF) 2011

Nigeria's disaster and emergency management is modeled around the National Disaster Management Framework. The National Disaster Response Plan, which had been in effect since 2001 as the first national document that made an effort to document disaster management procedures, was superseded by the Framework in 2011. As the name implies, the NDRP's scope was restricted to disaster response, which is merely one step in the disaster management process as a whole. However, this weakness and the requirement for a more thorough policy statement that would address the preparedness, mitigation, and recovery stages of disaster management led to the conception of the NDMF, a more comprehensive national policy on disaster management. Hence, among other purposes, the NDMF was created to act as a

legislative framework for the creation, development, and maintenance of all policies, plans, programs, and procedures related to disaster management (NDMF, 2011). Also, as part of its objectives, the NDMF was expected to provide a transparent and inclusive system, comprising the broad spectrum of disaster management including, institutional capacity, coordination, disaster risk assessment, and response among others.

Sadly, the NDMF has been marred by a series of issues with the country's policy environments. Besides funding as earlier stated under DRR, the commitment of state government towards the implementation of the NDMF was pathetic despite benefiting from the Ecological Fund. The State Emergency Management Agency in many states was poorly funded and understaffed (Adefisoye, 2019; Adefisoye et al, 2023). The cases in Ekiti, Kogi, and Oyo were particularly alarming, as SEMA got between fifty thousand and sixty thousand naira as running cost per month, and operated from dilapidated structures (Adefisoye, 2018; Adefisoye, 2019). The local government, which is considered by the UNISDR as the first responder and immediate service provided in disaster management was dysfunctional owing to the nagging issues of autonomy. NEMA as the lead agency in Nigeria's disaster management system is plagued by inadequate manpower, the absence of modern equipment, and poor funding among other challenges (Fagbemi, 2011; Sadiq, 2012; Onwubiko, 2012; Sani-Sidi, 2014; Adefisoye, 2019; Adefisoye & Agagu, 2021).

Politics, Political Will and the Implementation of Disaster Management Policies in Nigeria

Public policies emanate as a result of the government's intentions to address or regulate identified issues in the public space and are executed through an organized bureaucracy or authorized government officials. Therefore, however good an intention is or maybe, it is considered as mere wishful thoughts if not implemented. Woodrow Wilson observed that the broad plans of government actions are not administration, but the detailed execution of such plans is what constitutes administration. In other words, it is not enough to have a good policy roadmap, frameworks or laudable initiatives, working out the content, context, and intents of such is imperative.

Policy implementation is the stage in the policy process when political decisions are carried out through organised bureaucracy, public expenditures, and the activities of executive agencies. Scholars have thus identified it as central to the success of any policy. In other words,



a sound implementation is the bottom line of what the administrative enterprise is all about (Stillman, 1996). Also, the outcome of a policy is what consummates the policy process, not the intention. However, the realities of a policy in actual practice often differ from their original intention on paper as a result of certain factors that may be inherent in the policy process or from the policy environment.

Many well-intended public initiatives have fallen short of their intended purposes or objectives in the setting of the Nigerian state (as well as in many other African nations) because of inadequate implementation. The process of choosing, organizing, and carrying out pertinent programs and projects may be impacted by political, social, economic, bureaucratic, ideological, cultural, environmental, and other unforeseen variables. In addition to these elements, the Nigerian state's policy environment is full of contradictions and intricacies. Agagu explained that "the policy implementation in Nigeria is subjected to the whims and caprices of the chief executive and his associates; therefore, there is no commitment to policy continuity or stability" (Agagu, 2010, p. 21). Hence, Olugbenga (2013); and Adefisoye and Adefisoye (2020) posited that the policy implementation stage is often the graveyard of many good policies in Nigeria.

Specifically, notable works including Ayeni (2007), Fagbemi (2011), Etuonovbe (2011), Onwubiko (2012) Obete (2013), **Nkwunonwo et al**(2015), (Adefisoye, 2018; Adefisoye, 2017), Adefisoye (2019), Adefisoye& Agagu (2021), Adefisoye et al (2023) have directly and indirectly attributed the failures in Nigeria's disaster management to the lack of political will on the part of the government among other factors. However, what is yet unresolved is what constitutes political will and why it is often labelled as the reason for policy inadequacies in the country. As Linn Hammergrenhas opined, 'political will' is the slipperiest concept in the policy lexicon but the *sine qua non* of policy success. But it has been manipulated to justify policy failure. Sunjic(2015) argued thatlack of 'political will' is the dictum mostly deployed to defend or clarify the absence or the lack of execution of public policies, and is predominantly used by politicians. Without unnecessarily being repetitive, a lack of political will is a reflection of inadequate capacity or the unwillingness of policy-makers and government-authorized officials to implement a policy. The inadequacies may result from economic or material limitations of the state or as a result of corruption. Although there are many seen or unseen factors that may impede the implementation of policies as presented by Ikelegbe (2019), the challenge is that politicians in the country enjoy being politically



correct and would thus deliberately withhold their implementation capabilities.

As it relates to corruption, it is expedient to note that bureaucratic and administration corruption mirrors a lack of will on the part of policy-makers to deliberately divest themselves from the evil of siphoning public funds and executing policies. In his flagship work, *Saints, wizards, demons, and Systems: Explaining the Success or Failure of Public Policies and Programmes*, Professor Joseph Atsu Ayee aptly captured the three main variables that contend with policy implementation in Africa. Ayee (2000) depicts 'saints' as politicians or political leaders with noble intentions and people-oriented manifestoes, while saints are intellectual think tanks and policy experts with the capacity to transform such intentions into policies and action plans. However, 'demons' are individuals, authorized government officials, and bureaucrats that seek benefits from the failure of policies, particularly during the implementation phase.

Ironically, there are more demons than saints in Nigeria's policy environment. The attendant implication of such demonic infestations is evident in endemic bureaucratic corruption that has adversely impinged the process of disaster management policy implementation in the country. NEMA and the recently established Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management have become conduit pipes for siphoning public funds and platforms for providing jobs for the 'boys' and political chronic.

For instance, NEMA came under a serious probe from Nigeria's National Assembly in 2017, as the top hierarchy of the Agency was alleged of misappropriating an estimated 17 billion naira (Abuh, 2018). Findings from the probe by the House of Representatives show that the former Director-General of NEMA, Mr Muhammed Sani-Sidi kept twenty bank accounts with an estimated 27 million, six hundred and fifty thousand Naira; 37 thousand Euros; and 120 thousand US Dollars which directly flowed from NEMA (*Vanguard* 25th April 2018). Meanwhile, the Agency's staff embarked on an unusual strike in October 2017 to protest ill-treatment (Nnodium, 2017).

Conclusion

Although considered vague and slippery, pieces of evidence from Nigeria's disaster management sphere have brought to the fore that political will is a mandatory ingredient in the policy process which to a large extent determines policy success. The lack of political will as used in this paper is evident in the level of government's commitment

to implement disaster management policies in the country, Notably, inadequate budgetary provisions, low institutional capacity, and bureaucratic corruption as discussed in the body of this paper mirrors lack of political will. Although it can be affirmed that notable policies have been formulated since 1999 to manage the effect of disasters in the country, those policies have not lived up to their formulation goals owing to limited commitment on the part of the political authority. Although other factors with the country's complex policy context affected the level of implementation of those policies, the absence of decisive political, economic, and enforcement measures otherwise called political will contributed immensely to the level of the implementation of those policies. As earlier argued, the amount of the 'will' possessed by a political actor or the degree it is exhibited will determine policy success.

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